Current Intelligentsia on Woolwich

First posted on the National Policy Institute blog: http://www.npiamerica.org/blog/current-inteligentsia-on-woolwich/

On the afternoon of 22 May 2013, in the southwest London district of Woolwich, Drummer (Private) Lee Rigby, of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, was hacked to death with knives and a meat cleaver by two Muslims, civically British but of Nigerian descent, who previously ran down their victim with a car.
The killers, Michael Olumide Adebolajo, 28, and Michael Oluwatobi Adebowale, 22, remained in the scene, where the elder of the two justified their actions on video:

The only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers, and this British soldier is one, is a eye for a eye [sic] and a tooth for a tooth. By Allah, we swear by the Almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you until you leave us alone. So what if we want to live by the Sharia in Muslim lands. Why does that mean you must follow us and chase us and call us extremists and kill us? Rather you are extreme. You are the ones. When you drop a bomb, do you think it hits one person or rather your bomb wipes out a whole family. This is the reality. By Allah, if I saw your mother today with a buggy I would help her up the stairs. This is my nature. But we are forced by the Quran in Sura at-Tawba, through many, many ayah throughout the Quran that we must fight them as they fight us, a eye for a eye [sic] and a tooth for a tooth. I apologise that women had to witness this today, but in our land our women have to see the same. You people will never be safe. Remove your governments. They don’t care about you. Do you think David Cameron is gonna get caught in the street when we start busting our guns? Do you think the politicians are going to die? No it’s going to be the average guy, like you, and your children. So get rid of them. Tell them to bring our troops back so we can . . . so you can all live in peace. Leave our lands and you will live in peace. That’s all I have to say. Allah’s peace and blessings be upon Muhammad, as-salamu alaykum.

It later emerged that Adebolajo, who had a history of involvement in radical Islamism and arrests related to this activity, was radicalised by London-born Muslim cleric Anjem Choudary, whose group, Islam4UK (successor to the forerunner group Al-Muhajiroun), was later proscribed by counter terrorism laws.
Soon after the killing, BBC New rounded up ten experts to air their views on how to tackle the radicalisation of the Muslim youth in Britain. A clear effort was made to include Muslim voices—40% of the respondents. The resulting viewpoints provide us with a sample of what we must take is the best, most original, and most cutting-edge thinking the liberal mind can offer on the problem at hand.
The first viewpoint comes from Dr. Brooke Rogers, senior lecturer at King’s College London. In her opinion, tackling radicalisation is a matter of better education:

People can engage in volunteering and mentoring schemes, get employment in a non-governmental organisation. They can help make vulnerable individuals become part of a group.
But we do not do enough to encourage critical thinking in young people. Many undergraduate students are very good at regurgitating information, but in terms of challenging an argument, or knowing where to look for information to make a challenge, we are lacking.
So if you give young people the critical thinking skills in the first place, they will be less vulnerable to extreme views – whether that is Islam, gangs or drugs.
The problem in the UK is with the way that children are being educated.

Ironically, there is very little to disagree with here. Dr. Rogers has correctly identified alienation as a source of problem, and the need for belonging to a group as a desired-for solution. Dr. Rogers has also correctly identified some of the deficiencies in our system of education, particularly the lack of critical thinking skills.
She is wrong, however, in thinking that Rigby’s killers came to their current views due to a lack of critical thinking skills. On the contrary, Adebolajo’s remarks show that he has thought about British foreign policy critically, or at least been open to critical perspectives. Firstly, his are not the views of the political or media establishment in Britain, who, like the United States government and corporate media, think that bombing the Muslim world in order to install a secular system of liberal democracy is good for humanity. Secondly, and complicating things somewhat, Adebolajo’s views have a lot in common with the kind of critical, Left-wing views held by professors in the humanities in British universities—that is, that the West is engaging in a form of imperialism and Western government anti-terrorist measures are a form of oppression. In other words, Adebolajo’s views are quite compatible with what constitutes the mainstream within higher education.
It is worth noting that both the killers and Anjem Choudary are university educated, and that they were all born in the United Kingdom, a liberal, tolerant, and multicultural society. Even more interestingly, Adebolajo began life as a Christian and Choudary was once a party-mad medical student known as ‘Andy’, who, because of his partying, failed his first-year exams.
It would seem, therefore, that alienation, not lack of education, or lack of critical thinking skills, is the really important factor.
This takes us to what is, to my mind, is the most interesting of all the viewpoints expressed. Unsurprisingly, it comes from a Muslim born in Pakistan: Khalid Mahmood, who settled in the United Kingdom as a child, and is now a Labour MP.

Intolerance and hatred have been brewing in this country since the 1980s when we tacitly accepted the presence of extremist preachers such as Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri Muhammad.
Our own belief in freedom of speech, and the government’s preoccupation with the Cold War, gave them space to preach and recruit. At dozens of colleges and universities they targeted young men and women who had become alienated from their own communities.
Often second-generation immigrants, these individuals were easy targets as they struggled to reconcile their faith and life in a secular society.
They were rich pickings for these preachers with their message of moral absolutism and radical anti-imperialism. Organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir became fashionable in the 1990s and, while not as extremist as some, acted as a bridge towards more radical elements.
We need grassroots change in the community. The lesson we must learn is that if we tolerate extremist preaching on issues such as women’s rights and homosexuality then it very quickly turns to extremist preaching directed at the West in general.

Mahmood points to the difficulty in reconciling Islam with life in the West. He also correctly identifies the perceived moral dissolution resulting from the West’s secular liberal model, and the policy of ‘bringing democracy’ to the Muslim world, as causes of, not cures to, radical Islamism.
Standing on the common ground between Islam with the Left, Mahmood’s solution is anti-liberal and authoritarian:

While this problem has to be addressed by the Muslim community, government has a role to play and occasionally this has to be done by the security services – meaning that we should pass the Data Communications Bill into law.
The Data Communications Bill, proposed by Conservative Home Secretary Theresa May, is draft legislation that would require Internet service providers and mobile phone companies to maintain records (but not the content) of each user’s internet browsing activity (including social media), email correspondence, voice calls, internet gaming, and mobile phone messaging services and store the records for 12 months.

In other words, the way to tackle radicalism is more laws, more restrictions, and more policing.
As if to highlight the degree to which the mainstream political parties are—to repurpose George Galloway’s elegant phrase—‘two cheeks of the same backside’, Labour MP Mahmood’s prescription is well in line with that of Conservative MP Bob Stewart, who advises:

• ‘accept that . . . [Islamic fundamentalists] are at war [with us]’;
• ‘send them out of the country’;
• Fast-track the Data Communications Bill, ‘to give the security services the tools they need to deal with this threat’;
• And have ‘universities ban meetings that don’t allow women to attend, don’t allow certain races or types of person, or advertise as being anti our society’ (i.e., David Camerno’s ‘muscular liberalism’)

Stewart then ends with a suggestion, which provides a fascinating insight into the conservative (i.e., liberal) mind:

Why don’t [Muslims] have a rally against terrorism in Trafalgar Square, which would also help ease some of the tensions against them and may stop the hate crimes like the ridiculous attacks on mosques?
There should be a mass Muslim rally and they should stand up and say these terrorist acts are “not in my name”.

Huffington Post journalist Reyhana Patel blames the media of which she is a part, calling it ‘Islamophobic’ (this has become a meme since 9/11). Her solution is more multiculturalism:

There . . . needs to be a lot more interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim communities through more education and awareness.

Still, though this sounds like a vapid regurgitation of liberal clichés, there is a serious point here. We know that the killers, and their mentor, were all educated and aware, and Patel underlines this when she says

There are children being killed by Western soldiers in Afghanistan and there is little or no coverage about that. It makes people feel angry. There’s no avenue for them to act in a democratic way, because the government doesn’t listen to Muslim communities.
Therefore, the education and awareness she prescribes is one aimed at non-Muslims (a code-word for indigenous White Britons), who need to become educated and aware of the sources of Muslim anger. Adebolajo implied the same in his declarations. And with this one completely agrees.

Like Bob Stewart, Ross Frenett, of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, wants to focus on extremists and on putting an anti-extremist message out there:

the government should . . . focus its attention on assisting credible messengers in creating content to counter the extremist messages.
A focus needs to be placed on locating and increase the skills of those messengers who are most credible: former extremists, community leaders and survivors of violent extremism.
Government should aim to work with credible messengers such as our network, together with private sector expertise, and provide training and support for the creation of compelling counter-narratives that can be carefully targeted to ensure these messages reach the right audience: those reading and interacting on extremist forums, websites and social media sites.
Unless we see an increased focus on the creation of positive counter-messages to engage directly with extremist narratives online, the government will find itself in a largely fruitless game of extremist Whack-a-mole, expending a lot of effort with little to show.

In other words, bearing in mind that “the messenger is the message”, Frenett proposes to convince and train what one imagines would be Muslim spokespeople to promote a liberal worldview within their communities, thus offering an alternative to extremism. I imagine this would be popular among Muslim women, who have much to gain from liberation, but this approach fails to recognise that radical Islamism is caused by the liberal conception of Westernism, not by its absence. Put another way, this approach targets symptoms while ignoring causes.
Farooq Murad, secretary-general of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), recites the establishment’s party line. Though an advocacy group, the MCB represents that ‘moderate Islam’ we often hear about from liberal media commentators, but which is just as often eclipsed by events like 9/11, the Madrid bombing, the Danish cartoon protests, 7/7, the shoe bomber, and the underwear bomber, to name a few. The MCB has received government funding on two occasions, totalling £450,000, which went to a variety of projects, including a British citizenship programme, the British Muslim Equality Programme, and teaching materials for Muslim schools (madrasahs). The first part of Murad’s viewpoint epitomises complacent liberalism, ending with a touching story:

The reaction to Drummer Lee Rigby’s murder gives us an indication of how we combat extremism in this country.
We have seen reprisals: mosques attacked, people abused and hateful messages in our mailboxes and on social media walls. But we have also seen examples of partnership and solidarity.
The biggest repudiation of extremism came in the expression of solidarity across all parts of our society: this was symbolised so poignantly when the Archbishop of Canterbury stood in solidarity with Muslims to condemn the murder. It was also seen when the York Mosque defused tensions by inviting protesters from the English Defence League inside for tea.

This is followed by a by-the-numbers plea for more multiculturalism:

Engagement and participation are key, not isolation and exclusion. Muslim communities and institutions have examples here to encourage young people away from the allure of extremism.
We must be vigilant and ensure we do not inadvertently give into the demands of all extremists: making our society less free, divided and suspicious of each other.

In fact, Murad sounds like a classical liberal:

We do not need policies based on dogma and ideology rather than evidence and analysis.

So he asks for Muslims not to be painted with the same brush:

For example, terms such as Islamism, radicalisation and extremism all have been used in a confusing manner, serving agendas other than countering terror.
Sometimes they have been conflated with conservatism, orthodox practices or even opposing political views on foreign policy.

And deploys the fear-driven tactic of dismissing the views of radical Islamists as marginal and unrepresentative of general Muslim views; the multicultural project must go on:

This means targeting the wrong people, creating unnecessary fear, suspicion and further disengagement. The net result is that more people are marginalised from the mainstream and pushed into dark alleys to become easy prey for extremism, crimes and gang culture.
No doubt our mosques and religious institutions have a role to play. So have our community leaders and organisations.
But they have to be credited for the wonderful work they do, and engaged as equal partners. In brief, we need objective and evidence-based strategies involving all stakeholders.

Raffaelo Pantucci, senior research fellow at the RUSI security and defence think tank, and author of a forthcoming history of jihadism in the United Kingdom, argues that the path to radicalisation is unique to every person, and that

[s]imply shutting down websites and arresting individuals do not necessarily eliminate the problem.
On the contrary, such moves can drive people underground, making them potentially more appealing and attractive, or they will simply adapt to be on the right side of any ban.
This is not just a law enforcement issue. . . .

This is quite correct: law enforcement is merely reactive, and in the case of Islamism is not in any way preventive, since the Islamists have no fear of consequences, provided they can achieve their goals; worse still, law enforcement addresses symptoms, not causes.
Pantucci’s prescription, however, is emblematic of the kind of attitudes that make enemies of liberalism feel contempt for liberals:

As a society we need to counter the all-encompassing narrative that states that the West is at war with Islam. This is a message that should be repeatedly rejected at every level: politician, community worker, citizen.
Coupled with this, our societies should engage in practices that highlight how open and free we are, and hold power to account when mistakes are made.

Put plainly, radical Islamism will be neutralised by putting on a friendly face, being ostentatiously liberal, and demanding apologies from politicians. Is not this exactly the approach favoured by the liberal establishment? If this is what we must expect from a security think tank, we can be forgiven for not feeling very safe. Indeed, we can be forgiven for turning away from liberalism, opting for a line of thinking capable of providing root-and-branch solutions.
Dilwar Hussain, president of the Islamic Society of Britain, amalgamates elements from some of the earlier viewpoints, acknowledging the difficulty of reconciling Islam with the secular Western society, the need to find ways to integrate, and the need for security services to do their job.

People may often say that extremism and radical Muslim views are there because of a number of reasons, including conflicts that our country is involved in abroad and the discrimination that Muslims face at home.
. . .
Muslim leaders, preachers and teachers cannot become police or intelligence officers. The relevant agencies have to do their job in the way that they know best. But Muslim communities can play an important role.
They can give a clear signal of what Muslims actually stand for – peace – and what they will not have any time for – violence and terror.
But Muslims also need to think hard, as many are doing, about what our faith means to us today and how we can live that best in the context of modern Britain.

Pete Mercer, vice-president (welfare) at the National Union of Students, effectively tells us his main worry is that far Right groups will use the Woolwich killing to incite hatred against Muslims:

. . . universities are acutely conscious of their responsibilities and the institution concerned is carrying out a full investigation.
The higher education sector has a difficult balancing act. Universities are required by the Education Act 1986 to promote freedom of speech, but there are also duties to protect students from harm, including speakers who incite violence and extremism.
Identifying those speakers is rarely as clear-cut as some critics like to pretend: messages may be subtle, backgrounds unclear.
The NUS and students’ unions play their part, working with detailed guidance to assess risks and, if necessary, stop events.
Both NUS and many unions have “no platform” policies that specifically ban certain extremist organisations from speaking at official union events— including, let’s not forget, right-wing extremists such as the BNP.
There is a clear need for all in society to respond in the right way. The sharp rise in alleged hate crimes against Muslims and mosques since last week is deeply worrying. Politicians, the media and commentators must be responsible in their public pronouncements.
A panicked crackdown would be counter-productive, fuelling exactly the disaffection that makes some so vulnerable to messages of hate. A considered approach is critical.

Nicola Dandridge, chief executive of Universities UK, author of books and articles on equality and the law, recites a familiar line:

While universities have a duty to be places where difficult and controversial areas are discussed, there are limits, and they draw the line at speakers who break, or are likely to break, the law.

This is hardly worth our time, given that laws have been passed in Britain and in various countries in Europe that limit or stifle debate on the type of issues that would normally come under vigorous re-examination following events such as the one in Woolwich.

 *

If this is the best establishment minds can offer, we can take it as yet further confirmation—as if any had been needed—of the establishment’s intellectual bankruptcy, and its inability effectively to deal with the world in which we live today. Since this is the world ‘they’ created, and their solutions follow liberal principles, we can, therefore, speak not only of the intellectual bankruptcy of liberals, but also of liberalism itself. Hence, the recurrent theme in all the viewpoints above that the solution to the problems caused by liberal policies is more liberal policies.
This is symptomatic of the irrelevance of liberalism as a political philosophy today. The world we live in is much different from the world of the 18^th and 19^th centuries.
A radical rethink is needed.

The Anatomy of Radical Movements

First posted on Western Spring: http://www.westernspring.co.uk/the-anatomy-of-radical-movements/

A movement seeking fundamental change can be visualised as a Mayan pyramid, with each tier comprising a theatre of war, or plane of operation.

At the top of the pyramid are the philosophers, who develop the theoretical bases for the movement. This involves two processes: on the one hand, a radical critique of the intellectual and moral bases of the establishment, or the establishment’s position on a particular issue; on the other hand, the construction of an intellectual apparatus that morally and intellectually justifies the movement, built upon first principles.

These first principles may or may not include those upon which the establishment order is built upon. For example, Marxism was a radical critique of classical liberalism, which it sought to replace, but it shared with the latter a materialist conception of the world, a belief in progress, and a belief in the moral goodness of equality; the difference was that Marxism was the more radically egalitarian. Marxism was eventually defeated in 1989, but not without first having caused a mutation in liberalism, which went from emphasising liberty in its classical form to emphasising equality in its modern form. This mutation was mediated by the Frankfurt School and the New Left in general, and their adepts and collaborators in academia, the media, and various activist movements in the West—such as feminism or the ‘civil rights’ movement in the United States—which relied on Marxian theory.

This top level comprises usually a small group of individuals, though they will often be affiliated to a variety of interlocking or overlapping intellectual circles. Because abstract, the value of their work is not always evident among those with a practical orientation. However, on a practical level, the work of the philosophers is indispensable, because on them hinge all the arguments deployed by the movement, and the effectiveness of those arguments hinge, in turn, on their being supported by a coherent body of theory. Without theory, one is forced to rely on practical arguments. In many cases, these are sufficient, but experience has amply demonstrated that they are never so in cases where the point of view being advanced conflicts with the dominant morality. Even long-time opponents of multiculturalism who are at no risk economically may sometimes feel uncomfortable, and have enormous difficulties articulating their position, when questioned about their views on race in a mainstream public forum, despite having been macerated for years in economic data, crime statistics, and racial science supporting their position. The reason is that they have not been able to articulate their position in moral terms. In other words, they lack of moral theory of inequality that justifies their point of view morally. Without a radical critique of egalitarianism in the area of ethics, and without a moral justification for inequality, no strategy, no group, no argument deployed in conversation will get anywhere.

Below the philosophers are the strategists. It is by means of the strategists that the abstract principles and ideas of the philosophers are politically weaponised. An example that should be familiar to readers would be Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist. Gramsci was interested in the reasons why communist revolutions had triumphed in the East, but failed in the West. He concluded that what was getting in the way of communism in the West were Christianity and tradition. To bring about communism in the West, Westerners had to be cut off from them. His strategy was what we now refer to as ‘the march through the institutions’: the progressive infiltration of institutions by Marxists and their gradually taking control of them over the course of a generation or two as they grew in number and rose through the ranks, hiring and promoting each other. This strategy saw political power as the final step in a long process of acculturation, following which the accession of communism would not be resisted but be embraced by everybody as normal and logical step.

Not all strategies need be so grand. They may sometimes be as simple as choosing to change the way we talk about an issue or a group of individuals, since in public discourse the language that people use and take for granted often has certain psychological and political implications, about which they are seldom aware, but which, because people often reproduce what is said in the media, tends on the whole to legitimate the establishment ideology. We can think, for example, in the way we talk about immigration in the West. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with it: Peter Brimelow, who writes about this topic, is an immigrant himself. The problem is the type of immigrant, and what they do after they have migrated here. Some commentators have noticed that the word ‘migrant’, favoured by the mainstream media, is somewhat euphemistic, and have, accordingly, opted to refer to the same phenomenon as ‘invasion’ or ‘colonisation’. The problem is that neither term is satisfactory, because outside the anti-immigration milieu, they both come across as fear-mongering exaggerations: after all, an invasion is a centrally coordinated act of aggression, whereas the so-called ‘migrants’ act individually; while colonisation implies a metropole organising the effort, whereas the so-called ‘migrants’ come here from everywhere, without a directive and without anything like the Virginia Company of yore. Therefore, a better discursive strategy might be to reconceptualise ‘immigrants’ as ‘settlers’, and refer to them as such, on the basis that an immigrant submits to the indigenous authority, whereas a settler may initially submit to it for tactical reasons (i.e., to obtain residence or nationality) but ultimately does not recognise the indigenous authority and seeks, instead, to overthrow it, as is the case with radical Muslims. By using the word ‘settlers’ we highlight the fundamentally different nature of this class of individuals in relation to mere immigrants, thus forcing attention on the issue while neutralising many of the popular pro-immigration arguments.

Strategists do not necessarily always antedate the philosophers. I place them below because, conceptually, they occupy the second tier in a hierarchy that starts with the theoretical and ends with the practical, but in real life strategists may identify the areas and the types of intellectual activity that are needed strategically for strengthening arguments against the establishment position and exploiting weaknesses or contradictions in the establishment ideology.

Below the strategists are the organisers. Their function is to organise activists on the ground, so that political or metapolitical strategies can be put into practice in a manner that is effective. While strategists mostly read and write, organisers mostly read and talk to activists. In this capacity, they may have a triple role, because they are often activists and they have also to strategise, albeit at tactical-practical level. Saul Alinksy, the son of Russian Jewish immigrants, is a classic example from the ‘enemy’ camp in the United States: he was active furthering the cause of the Black Americans, and his frequently unorthodox ideas, which focused on the Have-Nots and are contained in his Rules for Radicals, were later adapted by some American university students during the late 1960s, forming part of their strategies for on- and out-of-campus organising

Organising, however, does not occur soleley within the framework of party politics or protests, and it does not even have to involve stomping on tarmac. In Israel, for example, seminars are organised with the aim of teaching internet users how to edit Wikipedia pages and ensure that anything to do with Israel is written in conformity with the Israeli point of view. What is more, areas of organising need not be confined to slogans or information; they can include anything from soup kitchens to cultural activities, high and low. Music festivals or carnivals have been a staple of anti-fa organising since the 1970s, while at our end of politics organising often takes the form of independent publishing, since mainstream publishers are controlled by political liberals, in radical and conservative flavours.

Below the organisers are the activists. From the foregoing it should be obvious by now that activism in a cause or movement is not limited to pushing leaflets through letterboxes or hurling Molotov cocktails. Options are limited only by the imagination, and can be as dangerous or as safe, or as visible or as invisible as one likes. An activist can be an artist, a musician, a journalist, a web administrator or developer, a radio presenter, a printer, a book seller, a publican, a conversationalist—literally anything. It goes without saying that, in many cases, an activist need not work as part of a group; he can operate, so to speak, formally unorganised, yet still informed by strategies and a particular body of theory

Finally, at the base, is the ordinary citizen—anyone who is not a philosopher, a strategist, an organiser, or an activist in the movement. Ordinary citizens are generally uninterested in or have only a very superficial knowledge of politics, which they derive primarily from the mass media of news and entertainment as well as private conversations. Many are quite ignorant, but this does not mean that they lack strong opinions. In fact, as the internet constantly demonstrates, many people out there express strong views on matters they know little or nothing about, reading what they want to read, hearing what they want to hear, and projecting their own biases, fears, and preconceptions onto everybody else. The general tendency for them is to go with the flow, and reproduce the attitudes and opinions of those they like and admire or by whom they want to be liked and admired. Much of this is determined very simply by individual relationships, based on blood, friendship, or power.

The overall direction of opinion, however, is determined by the dominant morality of the society. In our society, the dominant morality of our time is modern liberal morality, which enshrines equality as an absolute moral good. It is, in other words, radically egalitarian. Save for a small group of proud contrarians, outsiders, and extreme intellectuals, the moral goodness of equality is taken for granted and never questioned, being ingrained to the point that it becomes difficult to articulate an opposing position without casting oneself as a monster. It follows, then, that while it is possible to instigate a change of opinion on anything, the ordinary citizen will be most resistant to a change of opinion that challenges the dominant morality. The most radical of movements usually aim to change opinion in this fundamental manner

The relationship between the different tiers is thus clear: the philosophers inform the strategists, who inform the organisers, who inform the activists, who inform the ordinary citizens.

There is a final group that stands outside of this hierarchy, and yet is in a symbiotic relationship with it: the funders

In this group, I do not include individuals who may make small contributions to a cause from time to time, since that is a form of activism, but only individuals who, having excess wealth at their disposal, wish to use it on a large scale to change the world.

Most of who are apolitical or politically illiterate opt these days for philanthropy: in a radically egalitarian moral climate, it becomes imperative in the West for those who are thought to have too much to be seen helping those who are thought to have too little. Many of us remember how, twenty years ago, after being criticised for having too much money and not giving some of it away, Bill Gates eventually picked a cause and went with it, for the sake of public relations.

Some others in this category opt to support activities in their area of interest.

Those who are political, by contrast, opt for funding any number of individuals or organisations that support their views. They may do so visibly, or they may do so quietly, under the guise of ‘philanthropy’. And they may fund individuals or organisations in any of the tiers. Kerry Bolton’s Revolution from Above discusses how some of the most notorious radical social and political movements of our times—from second wave feminism to the colour revolutions of recent years—have been bankrolled by nominally philanthropic organisations.

Some readers of this website will, understandably, be discouraged at the thought of competing with a George Soros. What must be kept in mind, however, is that radical movements do not start out with the support of billionaires; they start out with modest means. The billionaires only come near the end, once the moral and intellectual groundwork has been laid out, once sound strategies have been formulated, and once there is solid organising activity taking place. Their aim is to change the world, remember, so they will put their money where they think it will be effective, and they will give it to those whom they think will realise their vision

The relationship between funders and the radical movement is symbiotic simply because they need each other: a movement cannot realise its objectives without funding anymore than a funder can realise his vision without a movement.

Having said this, and lest some think money is everything, a movement runs on two types of fuel. Money is obviously one of them. The other is words—millions of words that pour forth from every direction, in every area, at every level; words that ultimately rest, however distantly, on a particular body of theory, As I said recently.

A slogan on a placard, a talking point, or even a Molotov cocktail flying through the air en route to a particular window in a particular building, all have a body of theory behind it, and represent a distillation of a complex of concepts and values that originated at the level of abstraction. Millions of words are poured out . . . before that slogan is painted on the placard, that talking point is used in a conversation, or that bottle is filled with . . . petrol. And it may well be that the balaclava’d rioter does not understand a word of the theoretical texts . . . of the movement to which he belongs, but, unless he is engaged in random violence, he will know instinctively, through exposure to the mass of words around him, and through the feelings and attitudes inspired by them, which window to target with his Molotov cocktail and why it must be that window in that particular building and not another.

We can conclude from the above that those wishing to become involved in a movement for fundamental change have an endless array of possibilities. Any individual anywhere can use his particular experience, talents, knowledge, and skills and apply them in their chosen field of operation, in the manner that best suits them and best fits their individual circumstances.

Interviewed by Moritz Schwarz for Junge Freiheit

Note: The following is the full text of an interview conducted by Mortiz Schwarz for the German weekly periodical Junge Freiheit. A full-page interview, it appeared on the 3 May 2013 issue, on page 3. The interview was conducted in English and subsequently translated into German and, obviously for reasons of space limitations, edited down to fit. 

***

MORITZ SCHWARZ: Mr Kurtagic, why do “conservatives always lose”, as the title of your new book, which has just been published in German, suggests?

ALEX KURTAGIC: We need to look at what conservatives are conserving. Generally speaking, conservatives want to conserve the status quo. Faced with the Leftward push for change, they want to slow down a bit, or take a few steps back. A few steps back usually means the previous election, or the last time they were in power. Sometimes it means going back a generation or two, by which point mainstream opinion considers them far to the Right, even within their own parties. Meanwhile, our current political dispensation, certainly in the Anglo-American world, has been liberal for the past three hundred years or so. In this context, a conservative today is a liberal, albeit a slightly antiquated, nostalgic, or backward-looking one. Like all political ideologies, liberalism has an inbuilt logic that sets the direction in which it fulfils its possibilities. The reason conservatives always lose is that while they seek to slow down, stop, or reverse the change that liberalism brings in the fulfilment of its possibilities, they still accept the fundamental premises of liberalism—and in modern times also some of the Left’s—so they have no arguments other than those based on fear, which means that they are effectively answerless whenever challenged. Besides fearful, it also makes them seem unimaginative, boring, cowardly, irrelevant, and anti-intellectual.

Since 1945, conservative governments have been in power in most western countries the majority of the time. In spite of this, “the dominant political outlook in the West has drifted ever ‘Leftwards’” during the post-war period, as you say   – why do you think that is?  

Alexander Dugin has pointed out that there were three political theories in modernity: liberalism was the first one, the oldest and most stable; Marxism was the second, which was a critique of classical liberalism; and fascism / National Socialism together were the third, which were a critique of the first and second. Politically, the third was defeated in 1945 and the second in 1989, leaving only liberalism.

Liberalism and Marxism are the ideologies we need to examine here.

Liberalism is the political philosophy and ideology associated with Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Malthus, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, etc., etc., etc. It’s historical subject is the individual, who in liberalism is the measure of all things. The idea behind the liberal project is to ‘liberate’ the individual from anything that is transcendent or external to him (tradition, authority, religion, race, etc.); the individual is sovereign and makes his way in the world through the use of his reason. The liberal worldview is defined by individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, democracy, secularism, materialism, economism, and progress.

Marxism is a radically egalitarian ideology and its fundamental critique of liberalism was that it failed to deliver on its promises of equality—liberalism fostered a capitalist system that created self-perpetuating social hierarchies. Marxism attained political power mostly in the East, but it was always active in the West, as a constant pressure on liberalism coming from academia and political activists. In the East, Marxism was able to impose itself with brute force, but in the West it was forced to adopt a different strategy, and developed a moralising tone: Marxist critiques of liberalism in the West are invariably couched in ‘enlightened’ moralising language. This was effective because liberalism shares with Marxism the core idea that equality is an absolute moral good, and this makes it very difficult to oppose calls for greater equality. If equality is good everywhere and always, more of it can only be better, right?

Of course, the excesses of a particular government between 1933 and 1945, served as justification for moving further in the opposite direction.

Now, by the time Marxism died politically, much of its critique of liberalism had been absorbed by liberalism, which is why modern liberalism differs from classical liberalism. In absorbing this critique—a process mediated by the Frankfurt School and the New Left in general, with support from sympathisers in academia and the media from the 1930s through to the 1960s—classical liberalism, which had emphasised liberty, gave way to a form of liberalism that emphasised equality. Modern liberalism is radically egalitarian, just like Marxism. Against his background, it should not be at all surprising that the drift has been Leftward, and that conservatives have, despite electoral victories, proven ineffective as a force of opposition, and found themselves having (or preferring) to adapt and accommodate in the face of this drift, which is kept going on an issue-by-issue basis by the Left, in order not to rule themselves out altogether at the ballot box.

You consider the left and the right to be no more than variants of liberalism. If that’s true, is there any such thing as conservatism?

We suffer from a confusion in terminology. Our political language comes from the French Revolution, the terms Left and Right reflecting the seating arrangements at the French National Assembly. Left meant supporters of the revolution (i.e., liberalism), Right meant supporters of the ancien régime. With the Leftward shift of our political system, in conventional terms Left has come to mean Marxism (a form of anti-liberalism), liberalism has come to mean modern (i.e., radically egalitarian) liberalism, and Right has come to mean conservatism (classically leaning liberalism). Liberalism is, in our time, in the centre. Run-of-the-mill conservatives often use the terms “the Left” and “liberals” interchangeably or almost interchangeably.  This is certainly the case in the Anglo-American world. I suspect that by ‘conservative’ you mean something other than liberal. In this sense, from the point of view of electoral politics, the answer is probably a qualified no, in the sense that any genuinely anti-liberal party not on the Left will be tiny and little more than a protest vote or a sort of pressure group. For the reasons that I will get into later on, to be engaged with a genuine, non-Left alternative to liberalism, one has to be involved at the level of metapolitics. The latter level offers many options, however, from discussion groups and theoretical academic work to involvement in popular culture, which is today an important theatre in the culture war.

In Germany, many people currently support the new Euro-critical party “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD, Alternative for Germany). Just to give you an idea of their political agenda, party leaders say their objective include leaving the Euro and stopping the transfer of national sovereignty to Brussels and they refer to David Cameron’s EU policy as a model for their own policies. – What would these conservatives need to do to make sure they don’t “lose”?

The AfD looks to me like a conventional conservative political party, in the modern sense. David Cameron is notoriously liberal, it has to be said, and is committed to radical egalitarianism. It bears thinking that David Cameron’s Conservative Party has been governing in a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, and that 16 to nearly 20 years ago the then Liberal Democrat sought to work closely with Labour. All three main parties here agree on the fundamentals, which are liberal fundamentals. That’s why they are called ‘centre Right’ or ‘centre Left’. The Conservatives today may wish to be more fiscally conservative and may be less keen on centralised state regulation, but its philosophical principles are the same as the parties nominally to the left of it.

There is no real answer to your question because the AfD seems a perfectly acceptable option for someone who is committed to liberalism, but who simply disagrees with some of the economic policies of the other liberal politicians, and would like to make a mild protest without disagreeing fundamentally with the status quo. As is typical in liberalism, economics has a central role.

According to you, “anyone dreaming of 'taking back his country' by supporting the conservative movement …  is wasting his time.” Does that mean any enterprise such as the AfD is doomed from the start? Why would you say that?

As you have described them to me, and as I see them described, such a party may have a perfectly adequate role in the current political landscape, but that role is within a liberal framework, and is not what those who talk about ‘taking back their country’ mean by it, which is more radical than simply leaving the Euro. Those who talk about ‘taking back their country’ think in terms of anything from returning to the conditions of 50 years ago—or an imagined idealised version of them—in terms of values and the ethnic composition of the citizenry, to a return to a more classical form of liberalism, to the wholesale deprecation of liberal politics (classical or modern). Aspirations depend on who is using that vague catch-all phrase.

You also claim that “triumphant liberalism is made possible by conservatism, while triumphant conservatism leads eventually to liberalism.” Can you explain?

Conservativism offers no real opposition to liberalism, only a temporary attenuation of its more radical forms. This allows people time to adjust, or become accustomed to, change that has already occurred. However, the processes instigated by liberalism don’t stop; they continue, only a little more slowly. Overtime, however, these processes have add up to noticeable change, causing the existing categories and ways of doing things to seem antiquated, no longer fit for purpose, or simply irrelevant. Sometimes people simply get bored. This gives rise to a desire for ‘modernisation’, which means a temporary period of mildly radical liberalism. So we get a pattern in politics of centre-Left, centre-Right, centre-Left, centre-Right, with a continuing Leftward creed, and no real change in the fundamentals.

If you are right, conservatives lose because they deserve to lose, even though they don’t do anything wrong. That sounds as though you think conservatism itself is a political error. Please explain.

Not an error if you are a liberal, as I have defined it above. If you are not a liberal, however, then conserving the status quo, or wanting to slow down a bit or go back a step or two is indeed a political error, because that is not opposition to liberalism, but rather support for it.

You reject conservatives and reactionaries, and instead champion what you call “traditionalism”. Where is the difference between them? What would distinguish a “politics of traditionalism” and “traditionalist” parties from conservative politics and parties?

As previously stated, conservatism seeks to conserve the status quo, and I reject it for that reason: it is museological and necrophiliac. A reactionary reacts against change that has already occurred and wants to return to the state prior, and I reject it because I prefer action to reaction—action puts you in control, because you are the initiating agent; reaction puts the opposition in control, because the opposition is the initiating agent. I prefer to think in terms of tradition. Firstly, because it represents a point in a continuum that stretches into the past but also looks towards the future, since the tradition is no tradition unless it is actively continued. Secondly, because it is open to innovation—when you work ‘within a tradition’, you are not necessarily always repeating a ritualised procedure: you can add to it, or further develop what is there. Thirdly, because it links past and future, and offers dynamism and possibility, while still maintaining a framework within which one can find meaning, purpose, and direction.

At this point I’d like to stress that when I use the term traditionalism, I mean it in a broader sense, which is not restricted to Guenonian or Evolian traditionalism (although these critiques of modernity are useful).

Why do you think that thinking in terms of left and right stands in the way of tradition coming into to the fore? Why do we need to challenge it?

I think the answer to this question is contained in my reply to question 3, but the topic deserves elaboration. The Left-Right paradigm was defined by a revolution in which liberalism achieved political power. Therefore, the paradigm, the political landscape, was defined by the establishment of a liberal dispensation, which has left the opposition defined negatively—as a negation of liberalism, rather than as the proposition of something else. We will never get anywhere by adopting a negative identity, because people generally despise negativity and what it signifies: weakness, naysaying, tediousness, depression, lack of energy. People prefer vitality, dynamism, energy, creativity, sense of purpose. Hence, we need to think in terms of what we are for rather than what we are against. (Of course, defining what we are against is also necessary, but it is only one side of the equation). We will not have escaped liberalism until the Left-Right paradigm, and the terminology associated with it, has become meaningless and irrelevant.

The AfD is attempting to fight the left v. right logic as well. But the truth is that this concept of right v. left works – that’s why it is still in use today. And any party that tries to avoid conforming to it risks confusing and alienating the voters, who tend to think in exactly these categories. How would you be able to communicate successfully with the voters if they can’t identify where you stand politically?

Modern political philosophy, and thereby electoral politics, remains founded on egalitarian ethics, and has been since the 18^th century. That ethics sets the parameters of what is politically possible, so it any party seeking to win elections today would be ill advised to step beyond those parameters. This is why we cannot vote ourselves out of the current system. The system perpetuates itself. Change has to begin in the periphery, on the outside, and it has to occur first at the abstract theoretical level—at the level of ethics, or moral philosophy; at the level of first principles.

Now, because we live in a time of triumphant liberalism, to the point that, in the absent of any serious political challenger, liberalism is no longer political, but rather a practice that everyone takes for granted, it is common for liberalism and the West to be treated as nearly synonymous. In a broad sense, and often from the perspective of non-Westerners, to be liberal is to be Western, and to be Western is to be liberal. This leads many to assume that, when I speak of a change at the level of moral philosophy, I am advocating the wholesale overthrowing of Western ethics in order to replace it with something else. What they forget is that liberal egalitarian ethics is but one possible expression of Western ethics (and a very recent one, in the broader sweep of history), and that the West has had a succession of ethical systems throughout its history. What is really needed—if fundamental political change is desired—is a radical critique of egalitarian ethics. As suggested earlier, this critique needs to begin outside of electoral politics, obviously, and would only work its way in once it has been successfully articulated at the metapolitical and philosophical level. Once egalitarian ethics is faced with a serious challenge, once it is brought into question, once its adherents begin to question themselves and to engage in soul-searching, new political possibilities will begin to open up. It will not be until a non-liberal position can be articulated in moral terms that change will become possible.

The AfD is already being accused of right-wing extremism. If contemporary conservatism is, as you say, nothing but a variant of liberalism, or even just an old-fashioned strand of liberalism, why then is it frequently linked to right-wing extremist groups such as the BNP or its German equivalent, the NPD? 

Because it is all relative to where the criticism is coming from. The most vociferous criticism tends to come from the radical elements of Left-liberalism and from the Left. And the accusation, explicit or implicit, is that the target is insufficiently egalitarian, in some way or another. Remember now that equality is an absolute moral good, according to liberal and Marxian ethics, so to accuse someone of being insufficiently egalitarian is to accuse him of being morally deficient. In respect to egalitarianism, we live in puritanical times, so there is real fervour on this issue. It is, therefore, very difficult, if you accept that equality is an absolute moral good, to provide a moral justification for policies that don’t lead to maximalising equality, so these conservatives are left with few options but to lose themselves in lengthy explanations and self-justifications that no one believes, because they often seem disingenuous, self-serving, and hypocritical. All the Leftist has to do is enunciate a simple egalitarian slogan, loudly and proudly, or to accuse the conservative of Right-wing ‘extremism’ (i.e., of having a serious moral defect), to have the conservative mumbling, stuttering, and grasping for a polite way out of his sudden discomfort.

Do you consider the National Socialism of the 1930s and 1940s to have been another form of liberalism?

See above. 

On the other hand, the nation, freedom and the rule of law – values right-wing/conservative/traditionalist movements subscribe to – have their origins in liberalism. Does that mean that if you reject liberalism, you have to reject these ideals too?

In The Fourth Political Theory, Alexander Dugin explains that liberalism is the sum of its constituent elements, and that once you consider them separately, or partially, or partially in combination with elements that are rejected by liberalism, that’s no longer liberalism. Therefore, it would be entirely possible for us to choose which parts we want to keep, and which parts we want to reject, and how we want to combine those with other ideas, when thinking of a new political theory. In the aforementioned book, Dugin suggests areas of possibility for the construction of a post-liberal political theory (he doesn’t offer one, he only suggests areas political theorists may or may not want to explore, based on what liberalism has discarded or left in the periphery). Dugin is not a Westerner, so he may prefer a solution that will be unsuitable for us.  Nevertheless, the methodology is valid, and it is up for us Westerners to determine how a post-liberal political theory will constructed, and what a post-liberal West needs to look like—to determine who we are and what we want to become. I think it will have to be in accord with our collective soul and cultural traditions.

I would like the West to remain powerful, wealthy, independent, and technologically advanced, and for us Westerners to value our uniqueness, be free to do what we want in our part of the world, and feel pride in who we are.  The fact that we feel as if we have reached the end of time, as if everything has already been said and done everywhere, as if there is nothing original left to imagine, is symptomatic only of the death of liberalism. It means liberalism has nothing left to offer except an endless re-statement of the same, an endless re-iteration. That is why we say we are in ‘post-modernity’: if liberalism was an ideology of modernity, post-modernity is the time of liberalism on life-support, brain dead and ready for the post-mortem report.

How would you describe the “traditionalist” values you are advocating?

See above.

Is there any particular type of party that might offer a better hope of success than others? Or is it a mistake to engage in party politics in the first place? 

I wrote an article about the role of counter-propositional political parties last year, which has since been re-posted on various websites, including Western Spring (http://www.westernspring.co.uk/the-role-of-party-politics-in-the-culture-war/). I think these parties do have a role, but it is not the same as that of the conventional parties. With conventional parties the aim is to win elections in order to be able to exercise political power from political office. With counter-propositional parties the aim is to broaden the debate. Conventional parties would rather restrict debate to minor issues of methodology or procedure within the broad political consensus; they don’t want that consensus challenged. The counter-propositional parties are there to disrupt the consensus, to cast doubt on establishment positions by making it clear that there is no consensus when conventional parties would like everyone to think that there is.

Would you say that the current party system is geared towards advancing the interests of liberal parties, and that therefore conservatives are playing a game they can only lose?

Yes.

. . . unless, of course, by ‘conservative’ you mean something other than what I have described as a conservative. If you are thinking of something more radical, then the current party system can be defeated by discrediting the morality of its underlying propositions—by discrediting the morality of the existing consensus.

You talk about metaphysics, about transcending liberalism. Does that mean that any political commitment is pointless, that what we really need is a cultural revolution? If so, what kind of revolution?

Ultimately, the aim is political change, so we have to remain politically engaged. What I am saying is that since the 18^th century the dominant ethics in the West, or at least in the Anglo-American world, has been liberal ethics, which is egalitarian ethics: equality is treated as an absolute moral good, worth pursuing for its own sake. This needs to be subjected to a radical critique.

You may want to ask how. I have written several essays in which I advance various arguments attacking the morality of egalitarianism from a deontological perspective: ‘Equality as an Evil’, which was published in April last year; ‘Equality: The Way to a Meaningless Life’, which was published in February; and ‘Equality: A Justification of Privilege, Oppression, and Inhumanity’, which followed soon after. Currently, I am working on a book-length treatment of this topic.

Many of those who call themselves conservatives, for lack of a better label, know that egalitarianism is wrong. Unfortunately, they don’t have the arguments with which to oppose it as an ethics. They don’t have the tools with which to deconstruct it, destabilise it, and put in doubt. My project is to make available those arguments, to provide those tools, and start an in-depth discussion about egalitarianism as an ethics.

To my mind, egalitarianism is fundamentally unfair, because equality cannot be achieved without being unfair to someone, because it justifies an unfair distribution of rewards, because it justifies an unfair distribution of resources, whereby the deserving is penalised in order to reward the undeserving. Egalitarianism also justifies a system of oppression, because equality cannot be achieved without curtailing freedom (in fact, equality and freedom are in various ways incompatible), and requires constant monitoring and regulation, as we have seen with the advent of state-sponsored multiculturalism in the West. Egalitarianism also robs life of meaning, because meaning arises from difference and hierarchy—difference is what enables definition and self-definition; hierarchy provides you with direction and purpose.  The elimination of difference and hierarchy represents also the elimination of quality, both in the sense of superiority and distinction, so egalitarianism tends to rob life of everything that makes it good and worth living. To my mind, this is not an absolute good, but a moral pathology.

Most people don’t have the option of starting a cultural revolution, all they can do is support a party of their choice. What would you advise these normal people, who are neither intellectuals nor artists, should do?

There are other ways besides supporting a political party, although, as I said, there is a role for counter-propositional political parties, provided it is understood that the aim when supporting these parties is not the same as when supporting conventional parties. The culture war offers unlimited possibilities, because any person desiring change can apply his own talents, his own skills, and his own experience in their particular area of expertise. You can wage the war as a musician, as a painter, as a novelist, as a financier, as an industrialist, as a conversationalist—as anything you like, so long as you are pushing in the right direction, and pummelling the right targets.

What if your analysis of conservatism and its “eight salient traits” is incorrect? It bears a lot of similarity to the defamations the left likes to hurl against conservatives. You say conservatives are not creative. Would you say that the left is creative as such? As soon as left-wing and liberal parties have achieved their political objectives, they become equally uncreative when it comes to changing these objectives – in fact, they start clinging to them in a very conservative way. On the other hand, conservatives have always shown great creativity in intensifying their ideas. – Wouldn’t you agree that this historical overview challenges your description?

I think your question confirms my description. And yes, the eight salient traits are similar to the criticisms the made by the Left: the reason is that there is truth to all of them. In both cases, the criticism is a lack of radicalism. The Left is egalitarian and progressive, and Leftists fault conservatives for not being egalitarian and progressive enough; whereas I am an elitist and I fault conservatives for not being elitist enough. Now, if you are using the word ‘conservative’ to designate individuals or groups of individuals who are anti-liberal and anti-Left, individuals who think in terms of quality rather than equality, then I would agree that these are creators, whereas the liberals are debasers and the Left are destroyers.

Is liberalism really as powerful as you claim it is? Isn’t it possible that the ruling elite is only defending liberalism because it facilitated their rise to power? In other words, isn’t it possible that the power of liberalism is little more than a by-product of the battle between different social milieus, which resulted in the domination of one of these milieus and the dominance of liberalism as its intellectual superstructure?

Liberalism is a zombie. With the implosion or absorption of all serious challengers, liberalism has ceased to be political, since the political requires an enemy, an existential threat. Liberalism has become a practice, a way of thinking, of seeing, and of doing that is taken for granted, but which is no longer dynamic. It remains powerful because since its absorption of the Marxist critique its morality has not been successfully challenged.

Since we can’t go back and change history, conservatives have no choice but to engage with liberalism as the dominant reality. You accuse them of blindness – but isn’t this proof of their sense of what is realistically achievable?

In electoral politics, yes, because conservatives (as I define them) aim to conserve the status quo. That’s their only choice, which is why they always lose.

Having said this, and as I mentioned earlier, there are many who call themselves ‘conservatives’ simply because they lack a better label, but who are not proponents of the status quo. These need to embrace a radical tendency, a heroic ferocity, that builds something new from first principles. The Left continues to thrive because it is in touch with its radical tendency. Conservatives continue to retreat because they have cut themselves off from their radical tendency. A radical tendency is necessary, because that is the raging furnace where creative fury can occur.

Thank you very much for your time! 

Was the Immigration Act of 1924 Illiberal?

First posted in The Occidental Observer: http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2013/05/was-the-immigration-act-of-1924-illiberal/

In modern liberal historiography, the efforts of eugenicists towards immigration restriction in the United States, which eventually led to the Immigration Act of 1924, are perceived as having been illiberal, and therefore morally in contradiction with the liberal founding principles of the North American republic. But were they really?

The Immigration Act of 1924 was chiefly authored by Albert Johnson, a Republican Congressman, who was friends with Madison Grant, and who was by then, and thanks to the auspices of Grant, deeply involved in the eugenics movement. The campaign for the legislation rested to a not insignificant degree on data collected by eugenicists (see here, here, and here), though the debate was not necessarily all about eugenics.

The Act of 1924 was, however, not the first instance of legislation aimed at excluding undesirables. Grant had also successfully campaigned for what became the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, which introduced a quota formula; and for the Immigration Act of 1917, which barred illiterate immigrants over the age of 16, immigrants from South and South-East Asia and the Pacific Islands, as well as criminals, beggars, polygamists, and the mentally and physically defective.

Neither was the above legislation the only instances of immigration restriction in general. The Immigration Act of 1903 had excluded anarchists; the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 excluded the Chinese; the Immigration Act of 1882 made it possible to deny entry to ‘convicts (except those convicted of political offenses), lunatics, idiots and persons likely to become public charges’; and the Naturalization Act of 1790, the first piece of legislation to set rules for the newly created United States, made citizenship available only to ‘free white persons’ of ‘good moral character’, following two years’ residence and once year’s state residence. (The Naturalization Act of 1795 raised the length of residence requirement to five years, and the Naturalization Act of 1798 raised it to fourteen).

From this perspective, the Immigration Act of 1924 represented the culmination of a historical tendency. It was not a new concept, since all immigration legislation is inherently restrictive: all it did was extend the number of categories to be excluded.

Also, save in the case of the most extreme egalitarian or libertarian liberals, who would do away with any kind of restriction, be it on the basis that it treats individuals unequally or on the basis that it restricts their freedom, liberalism is not incompatible with immigration restriction, since its egalitarian and libertarian tendencies are tempered by others, which are just as integral to the ideology. To elucidate the matter we must dissect liberalism. Two points before we proceed: firstly, for the purposes of this discussion I am adopting the general and proper definition of liberalism, which includes classical and modern, not the one commonly adopted by conservatives in their lamentations, which are chiefly about modern liberals and the Left; and secondly, I have provided a breakdown of the ideas associated with liberalism before, here and elsewhere, so if you already familiar with it, you may want to skip the next paragraph.

The liberal project centres on the individual. The idea behind liberalism is to ‘liberate’ the individual from anything external or transcendent to him. This obviously allows for voluntary affiliations, such as political parties or football clubs, but not for the determination of the individual by race or the supernatural. A consequence of this ‘liberation’ is a wholly material and secular world, where man is left to make his way through the use of his reason. Thusmaterialism and secularism obtains rationalism. Another consequence isegalitarianism, since, without notions of divinity or divine lineage, all men are equally human, and the differences between them are superficial or a matter of degree. This obtains universalism. This also calls for a system of government with the widest possible franchise: democracy. In a material and secular world, the way to a better life is through material improvement. This privileges areas where reason can be applied to this end: science, hard and soft, and within science, economics. Thus scientism and economism. And, evidently, since the better life is a question of material improvement by scientific and economic means, liberals think in terms of progress, from minus to plus, from less to more.

Liberalism is, of course, not monolithic: it has classical and modern forms. Classical liberalism—the political philosophy of the Founders—emphasised liberty, while the modern liberalism has emphasised equality. The modern libertarian movement is, thus, a form of classically leaning liberalism, whereas modern liberalism is the result of the absorption by liberalism of elements of Marxism, which began as a radically egalitarian critique of liberalism. (More on this later.)

In relation to immigration policy, several trends emerge historically. Initial legislation was underpinned by rationalist considerations, i.e., the perceived need for organising the new nation according to a set of agreed rules. During this early period, much of the landscape was ‘wild’, and, beyond the original colonies, territories were open, unexplored, and ‘unorganised’. The liberal man, which at this time meant men of a certain class and social status, had yet to impose his will on—i.e., rationalise—the landscape. Most of the European settlers and European-descendent inhabitants during this period were religious, conservative, and traditional.

During its first century, citizenship-related legislation in the United States focused on naturalisation, and it is not until 1875, with the passage of the Page Act, that the first immigration restriction of undesirables came into effect. This, like the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, targeted the Chinese, who had been arriving in large numbers since the Gold Rush of 1848 in California, had generated a prostitution industry, and had come to be seen as depressing wages for the indigenous White workers. The Immigration Act of 1882 followed suit, introducing categories of undesirables for immigrants of all ethnic groups.

The bulk of restrictive legislation, however, was passed during the Progressive Era, which flourished between the 1890s and the 1920s. A chief concern during this period was addressing the perceived corruption, waste, injustices, and inefficiency of previous decades. In the United States, the eugenics movement is the product of this era.

The progressives focussed on purification and efficiency in all areas of life. This included:

• exposing corruption (e.g., the muckrakers); emphasis on science, technology, and expertise, and their application towards improving the environment, economic and social affairs, and conditions of life;
• greater democracy (e.g., women’s suffrage, direct election of senators);
• setting up municipal reference bureaus to study the budgets and administrative structures of local governments;
• strengthening the family through local and public assistance programmes;
• efforts to improve food and drug safety; advocacy of the censorship of motion pictures on moral and health grounds;
• the building of parks, in hopes of providing a wholesome environment designed to foster good morals and citizenship;
• Prohibition;
• the passing of compulsory schooling laws and emphasis on physical and health education;
• the professionalisation of medicine and medical training;
• the setting of national standards for law schools and university accreditation;
• the professionalisation of the social sciences, with an emphasis on science;
• the promotion of programmes for the Americanisation of immigrants;
• immigration restriction; and, of course, eugenics—the improvement in human quality.

Methodologically, the general theme was active intervention.

While there were divergent and competing tendencies among the progressives, the eugenics movement was far from peripheral. Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt, John Harvey Kellogg (Henry Ford’s physician),[1] for example, all key figures associated with the era, were friends of Madison Grant, who led the movement; while those affiliated with it, such as Henry Fairfield Osborn, Ellsworth Huntington, Charles Davenport, and David Starr Jordan, held academic positions in universities. Others, like Seth K. Humphrey, Paul Popenoe, or Lothrop Stoddard, were authors with mainstream publishers. Of the eugenicists already mentioned, not to mention Harry H. Laughlin, Roswell Johnson, Robert DeC. Ward, A. E. Wiggam, and Frederick Adams Woods, and others, all responded to Grant’s call to serve in the advisory council of the Eugenics Committee of the United States of America. Jonathan Spiro says in relation to them:

These were authors of major textbooks, editors of important journals, and quite often presidents of their professional organisations. Many of them served important roles in the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council, and six were past or future presidents of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.[2]

From the description given earlier, it is easily seen that the Progressive Era was consistent with the fundamental tenets of liberalism, only it represented a tendency within liberalism that emphasised progress.

From the description given earlier, it is easily seen that the Progressive Era was consistent with the fundamental tenets of liberalism, only it represented a tendency within liberalism that emphasised progress above all else.

The aims of the American eugenics movement are also consistent with liberal ideology, despite the fact that eugencists were openly critical of radical egalitarianism and were disdainful of its proponents. One could, however, be forgiven for thinking otherwise, due to the vigour with which eugenics was embraced by National Socialist Germany, and the subsequent efforts by radical egalitarians (be it of the modern liberal or Marxian variety) to discredit eugenics as somehow inherently fascistic. Yet, there were important differences in the way the Americans and their admirers in Germany approached their respective eugenics projects.

The eugenics movement in the United States focuses mainly on the social and economic inefficiency of maintaining (and / or permitting the growth) of a cognitive, psychological, and physiological underclass.

• Madison Grant, for whom the Nordic race was the highest expression of humanity, was concerned with the dilution of the Nordic stock through racial admixture.
• Lothrop Stoddard, whose doctoral thesis dealt with the French Revolution in the former colony of Saint-Domingue, was concerned with the danger of revolutions and upheavals springing from a cognitive underclass unable to cope with ‘the burden of civilisation’; he argued that this underclass was attracted to radical egalitarian movements, which were usually led by gifted sociopaths, because they offered freedom from that burden.
• Charles Davenport, director of Cold Spring Harbour Laboratory, was concerned with the elimination of heritable defects,[3] as well as with social and cultural degradation arising from White-Black racial admixture.[4]
• Harry H. Laughlin, director of the Eugenic Records Office, was also concerned with the elimination of heritable defects, physical or psychological.
• Paul Popenoe was concerned with social hygiene and marriage counselling.
• E. S. Gosney was concerned with the elimination of heritable mental illnesses and retardation.
• Henry H. Goddard was concerned with the elimination of mental retardation.

And so on. The overall thrust of the movement was in the area of negative eugenics, which aims to eradicate undesirable traits. And as far as immigration campaigning was concerned, the aim was, on the one hand, to prevent overall genetic degradation of the American citizenry through the infusion of immigrants seen as possessing undesirable heritable traits, and, on the other, to maintain the racial homogeneity of the founding Nordic stock. In as much as different heritable traits are caused by genetic variation, the elimination of an entire class of heritable traits, either through fertility control or immigration restriction, results in a reduction of genetic diversity. Therefore, the American approach tended towards greater homogeneity, and through this, towards greater equality, albeit at a higher baseline and within a population. The aim was not greater differentiation, but purification and greater efficiency through the elimination of undesirable divergences from an optimal norm. Its proponents may have disdained egalitarianism, they were still quasi-egalitarian, in as much as they considered below-baseline inequalities undesirable and sought to eliminate them.

By contrast, National Socialist Germany practiced negative and positive eugenics. The negative eugenics programme followed Harry H. Laughlin’s American model, and was instituted through the Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring. Lothrop Stoddard detailed some aspects of the positive eugenics programme, as it was envisioned (parts of it never came into effect due to the outbreak of war):

The Hitler Schools are designed to train what Nazis term “a new aristocracy” from whose ranks shall be drawn the future leaders of the Third Reich. In their choosing, the wealth or social position of parents is supposed to play no part. The candidates are selected from twelve-year-old boys, physically perfect and of sound Germanic stock, who have shown special aptitude in school and in the Hitler Youth. It goes without saying that the one indispensable aptitude is a record of unflagging zeal for Nazi ideas.

Those selected youngsters are a favored group. According to the plan, they are to pass six years in fine educational institutions where they receive every advantage, entirely at Government expense. Thereafter they are scheduled to pass into the regular Labor Service and do their military duty. After those tasks come three years of civilian life, earning their living or starting a profession in the ordinary way.

Then, at the age of twenty-five, they are to reassemble.  By a second process of selection, the most eligible thousand (from the Party viewpoint) are picked for the Nazi Order of Knighthood—the post-graduate School of Leadership.  In stately castles reminiscent of the medieval fortresses of the Teutonic Knights, they will pass four years of intensive training, wherein physical and ideological attainments are brought to the highest pitch of perfection. This elite thousand will then graduate, to take up their lifework of guiding and governing the Third Reich.

As is well known, the SS had a rigorous selection criteria that required proof of ancestry and considered racial phenotype, physical condition, and general bearing. Members were also encouraged to have large families. The overall thrust and aim of the combined policies was not just to purify and optimise, but also to breed an ever-higher Aryan type. In other words, policies aimed to differentiate as much as possible, favouring always they higher types with each passing generation. Systematic elitism of this nature goes beyond mere intolerance of mediocrity—it is, as Stoddard notes, wholly aristocratic.

Stoddard’s account makes evident that in Germany there was a much more intensive effort at centralised government regulation, affecting the entire citizenry. In contrast, the eugenic programmes in the United States were limited to prisons and insane asylums; they were not centralised but operative at the state level. This was more compatible with American (and liberal) ideas of individualism than the German effort, which was collectivist in orientation.

Some may argue that the American eugenic movement ran against the absolute core premise of the liberal project—the ‘liberation’ of the individual—on the basis that it subordinated the individual to heredity by treating the latter as an overriding determinant. However, the aim of eugenics is not submission to heredity, but, rather, the understanding of biological fact and the improvement of individual quality of life through the scientific control of hereditary processes. Increased knowledge and control over nature by mankind in pursuit of its rational self-interest are integral to the project of liberation.

Just as importantly, American eugenicists saw institutions as biologically derived. By campaigning for immigration restriction, excluding specifically immigrants from more collectivist cultures, the American eugenicists sought to preserve Anglo-Saxon individualist institutions.

Similarly, the exclusion of immigrants thought likely to become burdens to the public purse has the effect, for the individual citizen, of optimising economic freedom.

Perhaps an important difference between the American and German approaches to race is the presence in Germany of occult and mystical conceptions of Aryanism. These predate National Socialism, of course, and post-war literature about alleged Nazi occultism is replete with exaggerated claims. But a neo-pagan, ariosophical, occult tendency or subtext did exist in Himmler and the SS. Even if direct ariosophical influence is difficult to find, the mere fact that National Socialism developed against a background of romantic and mysticalVölkisch ideas, which were in themselves an explicit rejection of liberalism, is significant. This stands in sharp contrast with the puritanical, practical, and strictly scientific orientation of the Americans. While the German eugenics project could be said to have been anti-human, in as much as it sacralised race and sought to transcend the human in pursuit of a higher species; the American project was humanist, in as much as it sought to purify and perfect the human.

We are, then, left with the question: if the Immigration Act of 1924 was consistent with the worldview of American liberalism, why was it so vehemently opposed by individuals we would describe as liberal?

Kevin MacDonald has noted that the strongest opponents of the Act were Jewish activists and the organised Jewish community. He has also noted that Jewish intellectual movements during the the 20th century, which included the radical Left, critical theory, and Boasian anthropology (the latter two of which were either reliant or compatible with the ideas of the Left), as well as support for them in academia and mainstream media, were instrumental in deposing the founding Anglo-Saxon establishment, and replacing it over time with another, comprising individuals we would, again, describe as liberals. Yet, the old Anglo-Saxon establishment, though often described as ‘conservative’, was fundamentally liberal—for the most part, ‘conservative’ means simply liberal in the classical mould.

The key to this question lies in the existence of different tendencies within liberalism, as well as in the effect on liberalism of Marxian criticism.

Marxism’s critique of classical liberalism was that by fostering a capitalist system, it perpetuated hierarchies and thereby failed to deliver on its promise of equality. Marxism was able to attain political power in the East through the use of force, but in the West this proved difficult, and some Marxists realised that conditions required a socio-cultural approach. At the same time, Marxism underwent criticism—though not rejection—from within, and, through the synthesising by a new generation of intellectuals of the theories of Freud and Boas, the Marxian class-based historiography was transliterated into variants based on psycho-sexuality and Western ‘racism’. Against the background of National Socialism, their mission was now not to liberate the proletariat (which had supported National Socialism), but to ‘liberate’ the White man from his inbuilt fascism and racism, and the coloured ‘subaltern’ from White supremacy. The Frankfurt School and later the New Left were emblematic of this tendency, and they approached their task both culturally, through radical criticism of the Enlightenment, and pseudoscientifically, through the pathologisation of racial identification among Whites and the discrediting of biological conceptions of race. These radical egalitarian movement applied constant pressure on the old establishment from the 1930s onwards. But while in the end they succeeded in deposing the old liberals, they failed to dislodge liberalism. Marxism’s pronounced collectivism was repellent to, and incompatible with, individualist Anglo-Saxon sensibilities. Moreover, campaigners on the Left and certainly the aforementioned Jewish intellectual movements found it useful to frame their arguments in the language of the Enlightenment. The result was a synthesis, whereby classical liberalism gave way to a new liberalism that was radically egalitarian. This enabled liberalism to hold on to its foundational individualism, and simply shift the emphasis onto egalitarianism, which was one of its core ideas anyway.

This was possible because both Marxism and liberalism—progressive or otherwise—are both committed to an ethics of equality, and this, therefore, made it difficult for the old (conservative) liberals to present arguments against Marxist calls for greater equality. Hence, the pattern of retreats, surrenders, and compromises by conservatives in the face of relentless attacks from the Left and pressure groups reliant on the ideas of the Left.

As the radically egalitarian form of Left-liberalism gained ascendancy, it became increasingly difficult to maintain a rationalist-progressive immigration law that privileged other considerations above equality. The radically inegalitarian policy of the National Socialists, combined with intensive pressure from Jewish activists in academia, media, and government, provided further incentives to move decisively in the opposite direction. Hence, the redefinition of Americanism as a primarily egalitarian credo—an altruism of maximal catholicity. Hence, the repeal of the Act of 1924 by Lindon Johnson—two years earlier, his predecessor, John F. Kennedy, had already found the quota system ‘nearly intolerable’.[5]

Ultimately, while there is a practical level of analysis, at the theoretical level the repeal of the Immigration Act of 1924 symbolises the transition from one form of liberalism into another. Notwithstanding the mild deviationism of American eugenicists, the law they campaigned for was, therefore, fully consistent with the liberal project, and not at all in contradiction with the liberal founding principles of the United States.

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[1] Jonathan Spiro, Defending the Master Race: Conservation, Eugenics, and the Legacy of Madison Grant (Lebanon, NH: University of Vermont Press, 2009) 379.

[2] Jonathan Spiro, Defending the Master Race: Conservation, Eugenics, and the Legacy of Madison Grant (Lebanon, NH: University of Vermont Press, 2009) 181.

[3] Charles Davenport, Heredity in Relation to Eugenics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911).

[4] Charles Davenport and Morris Steggerda, Race Crossing in Jamaica(Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1929).

[5]  “235 – Remarks to Delegates of the American Committee on Italian Migration.”. The American Presidency Project. June 11, 1963.